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ABSTRACT
As news agencies and the public increasingly rely on User-Genera-
ted Content, content verification is vital for news producers and
consumers alike. We present a novel approach for verifying Web
videos by analyzing their online context. It is based on supervised
learning on contextual features: one feature set is based on an ex-
isting approach for tweet verification adapted to video comments.
The other is based on video metadata, such as the video descrip-
tion, likes/dislikes, and uploader information. We evaluate both on
a dataset of real and fake videos from YouTube, and demonstrate
their effectiveness (F-scores: 0.82, 0.79). We then explore their
complementarity and show that under an optimal fusion scheme,
the classifier would reach an F-score of 0.9. We finally study the
performance of the classifier through time, as more comments ac-
cumulate, emulating a real-time verification setting.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
User Generated Content (UGC) currently plays a major role in
news reporting. The ubiquitous usage of social media means that
non-professionals can contribute vital new information to a news
story, including images and videos, that would otherwise be in-
accessible to news organizations. However, this new reality also
carries risks: UGC originates from unverified sources, and its ve-
racity is by no means guaranteed. Indeed, though the problem of
“fake news” gained prominence in the public debate relatively re-
cently, there have already been cases of fake UGC attempting (and
often succeeding) to find their way into mainstream news sources
in recent years (Figure 1). Thus, there is increasing demand for
tools that can assist investigators to timely detect fake content.
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Figure 1: Thumbnails from recent UGC. Top: two fake
videos, “Snake hawk” and “Hezbollah sniper kills ISIS”. Bot-
tom: two real videos, “Turkey coup” and “Hetauda rhino”.
A significant body of research deals with the automation of
news story verification using Web and social media content [9].
One approach is to use tampering detection algorithms for images
[8, 10] and videos [5]. Such algorithms have reached a state that
allows real-world application with some success [11]. However, in
many cases such algorithms fail [10], while in other cases the def-
inition of “fake” extends beyond tampering, thus rendering such
algorithms irrelevant. For example, some fake news videos may
mislead regarding the context in which they were captured, while
others may be staged using studios and actors, and presented as by-
stander videos. In these cases there is no tampering to detect, and
forensics algorithms cannot help. Our study of fake videos has led
us to identify five types of fake content among news-related UGC:
(1) Staged videos in which actors perform scripted actions un-
der direction, published as UGC.
(2) Videos in which the context of the depicted events is mis-
represented (e.g. the claimed video location is wrong).
(3) Past videos presented as UGC from breaking events.
(4) Videos of which the visual or audio content has been al-
tered through editing.
(5) Computer-generated Imagery (CGI) posing as real.
As tampering detection only deals with cases 4 and 5, we need
to explore complementary approaches. One such approach is to
verify UGC by analyzing the social media posts that disseminate
it. There is growing research dedicated to verifying social media
posts – most commonly tweets – based on their text, but also from
the context around them [4, 7]. In this case, context refers to social
media activity surrounding the post, such as likes/favorites, shares,
replies, aswell as the characteristics of the user, such as the number
of followers. In the last two years, the MediaEval benchmark has
included a “Verifying Multimedia Use” task [1, 3] with the aim of
evaluating the veracity of media posted on Twitter using textual,
contextual, and image forensics features. The task showed that it
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is feasible to assess news-related posts, not only by analyzing the
multimedia items or confirming the factual veracity of the posts’
claims, but by analyzing the style and context of the posts.
This paper presents a novel approach for detecting fake Web
videos by analyzing their context. We adapt a supervised learning
approach [2] initially designed to verify Twitter posts using contex-
tual features, to the problem of Web video verification. By relying
solely on contextual features instead of visual ones, we can detect
fake videos even when tampering detection algorithms fail, in a
much faster and more scalable manner. While the principles can
be easily applied to most existing video platforms, our implemen-
tation is currently based on YouTube due to its popularity. In par-
ticular, a video credibility descriptor is proposed based on scores
produced for YouTube comments using a credibility model origi-
nally trained on a corpus of tweets. A second descriptor is based on
features directly extracted from YouTube metadata. Experiments
demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. A further contri-
bution includes our analysis of how the verification performance
is affected by the evolution of video comments over time.
The main contributions of the work presented in this paper are:
a) an annotated dataset of real and fake videos, b) an approach for
fake video detection using video comment credibility and video
metadata features, and c) an analysis and evaluation of video com-
ment distribution through time, and its effect on video verification.
2 METHOD DESCRIPTION
The method we propose extends our previous work on tweet veri-
fication [2] to Web videos, YouTube in particular. We employ a su-
pervised learning approach using two types of feature, and study
the potential of fusing them. The first type of feature is based on
video comments. Our expectation is that the same characteristics
that can help distinguish fake from real tweets can also be applied
on YouTube comments. The basis for the proposed approach is a
first-level classifier trained on a corpus of tweets annotated as real
or fake. The model is an adaptation from a submission to the Medi-
aEval “Verifying Multimedia Use 2016” Task [2] that proved to be
successful in detecting fake tweets. In the original approach, a fea-
ture vector is formed from a number of tweet content- and context-
based descriptors, and an RBF SVM is trained to classify tweets as
“real” or “fake”. In order to apply the same protocol to YouTube
comments, we need to adapt the features accordingly. For instance,
features such as the number of retweets are not applicable. Table 1
lists the features used for comment classification. Note that these
are only indirectly related to the post veracity. While it would be
relatively easy to include telltale features (e.g., the presence of the
word “fake” in a tweet or comment), and such a choice could lead
to improved success rates in our evaluations, we do not consider
that they would be helpful in real-world settings. The reason for
this is that we intend to apply our method to videos, of which the
veracity cannot be easily assessed by a human, and hence should
not rely on users explicitly stating that a video is fake.
In our approach, we first extract these features from a dataset of
fake and real tweets, and use them to train a two-class RBF SVM.
We then extract the same features from the comments in a dataset
of fake and real videos, and use the SVM to classify each comment.
This produces a [0,1] value for each comment, corresponding to
Table 1: Comment-level features
# Feature description
01 Text length
02 Number of words
03-04 Contains question/exclamation mark (Boolean)
05-06 Contains happy/sad emoticon (Boolean)
07-09 Contains 1st/2nd/3rd person pronoun (Boolean)
10 Number of uppercase characters
11-12 Number of positive/negative sentiment words
13 Number of slang words
14-15 Has ’:’ symbol/’please’ (Boolean)
16-17 Number of question/exclamation marks
18 Readability score
Table 2: Video-level features
# Feature description
From channel description
01 Channel view count
02 Channel comment count
03 Channel subscriber count
04 Channel video count
From video description
05 Text length
06 Number of words
07-08 Contains question/exclamation mark (Boolean)
09-10 Contains 1st/3rd person pronoun (Boolean)
11 Number of uppercase characters
12-13 Number of positive/negative sentiment words
14 Number of slang words
15 Has ’:’ symbol (Boolean)
16-17 Number of question/exclamation marks
its credibility score. The estimates for all the comments of a video
can then be aggregated to form a video-level descriptor, which can
exploit patterns in the comment characteristics, and enable the cre-
ation of a second-level model that can classify YouTube videos as
real or fake. In our approach, the aggregate descriptor is formed as
the 10-bin histogram of first-level estimates of all comments in a
video. The [0,1] range is split into 10 bins, and the number of com-
ments with credibility scores falling into each bin is counted. The
number of 10 bins was determined experimentally to lead to a low-
dimensional but effective representation. The comment credibility
histogram then serves as a video-level descriptor. A second-level
RBF SVM classifier is trained on these video descriptors to tell fake
from real videos.
The other type of feature is extracted directly from the video
metadata. These include features that describe the uploader chan-
nel, and also text-based features from the video description. These
are then used to train a classifier to distinguish fake from real
videos directly based on their context. Table 2 presents the 17 fea-
tures we extract from the video metadata. They are inspired by the
ones in Table 1, but we have kept only those that can be applied to
the video channel information and the video metadata. Thus, the
video descriptor consists of 17 boolean and integer values, which
are then used to train an RBF SVM classifier. In selecting both the
comment and the video descriptors, we ignored features that took
uniform values for all items in the dataset. For example, the feature
“Contains 2nd person pronoun” was false for all video descriptions,
and thus was not included in the list of video features.
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3 EXPERIMENTS
3.1 Datasets
The comment-level classifier requires a large dataset of fake and
real tweets or comments for training. The Image Verification Cor-
pus1 (IVC) is such a dataset. It contains 17,857 tweets from 53 past
events, 7,229 of which have been labeled real and 10,628 fake, and
was used for the MediaEval Verifying Multimedia Use tasks.
Video-level classification requires an annotated dataset of fake
and real videos. To this end, we created the Fake Video Corpus
(FVC), a collection of UGC YouTube videos from the recent past
around news stories that have been verified as factual. The set
contains 55 fake videos and 49 real ones. Each video contains on
average 856 comments. A first version of the FVC – containing
the fake videos – is already publicly available [6], and we intend
to upload an updated version which will include the real ones. The
example videos shown in Figure 1 are indicative of the dataset.
3.2 Evaluation
Concerning the comment-based features, the first set of evalua-
tions dealt with their ability to distinguish between real and fake
UGC videos in their current state, i.e. using all the comments that
have been accumulated from the first posting until “now”. The
comment-level classifier was trained on the IVC, and then used
to produce credibility scores for all comments of the FVC videos.
For each video, the scores of its comments were aggregated into a
10-bin histogram serving as a descriptor for the entire video. The
FVC dataset was split into training and test sets using 10-fold cross-
validation to evaluate the performance of the comment-based ap-
proach. Results are shown in Table 3 (“Comments” row).
With respect to the video metadata approach, the features of Ta-
ble 2 were extracted from all videos of the FVC, and an RBF SVM
classifier was trained and evaluated on the dataset using 10-fold
cross-validation. Results are shown in the “Video metadata” row
of Table 3. The third row also shows the results of an ideal fusion
method having an oracle select the correct classifier: this will make
a mistake only when both classifiers make a mistake. The oracle-
based fusion yields a significant increase in performance, which
means that the two classifiers are complementary, and we would
benefit by combining them under an appropriate scheme. How-
ever, as our initial attempts at combining the two models using
simple feature concatenation (early fusion) did not yield signifi-
cant success as yet, how to perform fusion effectively is still an
open question.
Table 3: Video classification results
Precision Recall F1
Comments 0.88 0.74 0.79
Video metadata 0.88 0.79 0.82
Ideal fusion 1.00 0.83 0.90
Despite the encouraging results from these first tests, there is a
caveat: these videos were found to be fake quite a long time ago,
and this will most likely have affected the characteristics of their
comments, as many users have written their comments after they
1https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-verification-corpus/tree/master/
mediaeval2016
Figure 2: Number of videos with zero comments after spe-
cific time intervals.
Figure 3: Average number of comments per video through
time. Standard deviation bars were scaled down by 10 for
the sake of clarity.
already knew that the video is fake. For the needs of breaking
news reporting, this is not a realistic usage scenario, as generally
we need to be able to evaluate a video during the first minutes or
at most hours after it is posted.
As a result, we ran a second set of evaluations based on this
principle. We defined a number of time limits (e.g., 5’, 30’, hour,
day, week) after the video was first posted, and only retained for
each video the comments that were made before each limit. Out of
the 55 fake and 49 real videos, Figure 2 shows the number of videos
having zero comments (whichwere left out of the evaluation). This
is one limitation of our approach, as the comment-based classifier
cannot operate on videos without comments. Figure 3 shows the
average number of comments per video. It should be noted that
the standard deviation bars are scaled down by 10, which indicates
an extremely high variance in the number of comments. For the
evaluation at different time frames, we tested two approaches. One
is to train a classifier using all available comments in the training
set (single classifier), and use this model to classify videos at any
time frame. The other is to train one classifier for each time frame
(multiple classifiers), using those comments in the training set that
correspond to that time, under the assumption that the passing of
time does not affect only the number of comments but also the
distribution of their credibility values. Figure 4 shows the results
for the two approaches. It can be seen that the single classifier
performs better early on, although still quite low (F1-score<0.5). At
6 hours the multiple classifiers approach performs better, reaching
F1=0.73, and the two approaches ultimately converge.
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Figure 4: Comparison between the single and multiple clas-
sifiers approaches.
Figure 5: Comparison of comment credibility estimate dis-
tributions between real and fake videos.
In trying to interpret the classification results, we attempted
to study the feature value distribution, and see if any significant
differences appear between the two classes. Figure 5 shows the
mean comment histogram feature for all “fake” and “real” videos.
By comparing the histograms at different times, we observed that
the overall distribution remains fundamentally unchanged as the
comment sections evolve, thus we are only presenting the results
for all comments (i.e. after convergence). It is clear that the two
sets exhibit differences. Histogram values for real videos seem to
follow a unimodal distribution, peaking at bin 8, while for fake
videos there is a peak at 9, and two smaller ones at bins 4 and 6. It
is currently difficult to interpret the cause of these differences. It
appears that a classifier trained on tweets tends to return higher
values (centered at 0.8-0.9) for YouTube comments, corresponding
to a high probability of the comment being assigned to the “fake”
class. However, it is also clear that a significant percentage of low-
value (high credibility) comments appear under fake videos - these
could actually be user comments debunking the video, but a deeper
analysis would be necessary to confirm this. The code and data
necessary to reproduce our experiments can be found on GitHub2.
4 CONCLUSIONS
We presented a methodology for automatically assessing the ve-
racity of YouTube videos based on supervised classification using
two types of feature. One builds upon well established features
2https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/contextual-video-verification/tree/master/MFSec_
2017
for detecting fake Twitter posts, which we adapted to YouTube
comments, while the other is based on similar features extracted
from the metadata of a YouTube video and its channel. While the
approach was tested exclusively on YouTube videos, it can be ex-
tended to other platforms providing similar context (video descrip-
tions, user profile, comments) such as Dailymotion or Facebook. It
is in our future plans to adapt and test the approach to such plat-
forms. Evaluations demonstrated the effectiveness of both features
in telling apart fake from real videos, without having to analyze the
actual visual content. Furthermore, we demonstrated the comple-
mentarity of the two features, which suggests that, under a reliable
fusion scheme, we could achieve even better results.
However, the small size of our dataset and the overall difficulty
of collecting real-world, relevant videos for both categories – real
and fake – does not currently allow us to performmore exhaustive
evaluations, or train an optimal fusion model. Further evaluations
on the time needed to accumulate enough comments for successful
detection demonstrated that, while during the first hour we do not
usually have enough information to produce a reliable estimate,
performance picks up relatively quickly, and can lead to relatively
reliable estimates during the first six hours after the posting. As
the video description and metadata already provide reliable results
from the moment the video is posted, it seems more reasonable to
rely more on such features early on, while our current comment
features appear to become useful at a later stage.
Given the encouraging initial results of our approach, our plan
is to extend it with the aim of offering a tool for verification as-
sistance, targeted at news professionals and laypeople alike. One
step in this direction would be to extend the Fake Video Corpus,
to allow for a wider training set and more exhaustive evaluations.
Manually identifying fake and real videos is a labor-intensive task.
However, both the comment- and video-based models could ben-
efit from a larger training set. Furthermore, a larger set would
allow more reliable evaluations leading to deeper insights on the
strengths and weaknesses of the approaches.
Another step would be to identify which features really con-
tribute to the classification. Our preliminary analysis showed that
there exist significant differences in the comment credibility es-
timate distributions between the two sets. However, a targeted
analysis is necessary to identify how the tweet classificationmodel
translates to YouTube comments.
Furthermore, we intend to work towards a fusion scheme be-
tween the two features, to exploit their complementarity towards
increasing the overall accuracy. We believe this is partly depen-
dent on broadening the current video dataset, to allow for more
elaborate fusion schemes, since our initial efforts towards using a
simple approach such as feature concatenation have not yielded
any significant improvement. Building a large enough set to train
a specialized fusion model seems a promising approach, given the
performance of the oracle scheme.
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